GUPTA PANKAJ KUMAR, BHATIA JASJIT: Investment sensitivity and managerial decision making behaviour of Indian fi rms. Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, 2013, LXI, No. 7, pp. 2157-2162 Contemporary models of the fi nancial theory support the proposition that the stock prices should be fundamentally a refl ection of the discounted value of earnings. Accordingly the investors and analysts should base their expectations on the expected future cash fl ows that are logically correlated or have a carry over eff ect vis-à-vis present stream of cash fl ows. This logically implies that the managers would have an incentive to manipulate investor's expectation of future cash fl ows. The zeal to maximize the fi rm's value based on market capitalization is expected to have a detrimental eff ect on the investment decisions leading to sub optimality. Given the imperfect information structure and market pressures, the Indian fi rms suff er from mispricing and as such the conventional robust theoretical models of agency confl icts cannot be refuted. This motivates us to examine the interrelation ship between the concerns for valuation and investment sensitivity. We use a sample statistics of selected listed fi rms that represent the CNX Ni y Index and test for the dependence of the investment behavior of the fi rm, on the sensitivity of the fi rms' share prices to its current cash fl ow represented by surprise earings. We use the earnings response coeffi cient (ERC) framework proposed by Ball and Brown (1968) for 11 key industries in India. We fi nd that the surpise in accounting earnings announcements is negatively associated with abnormal stock returns and the investment decisions taken by the fi rms are negatively sensitive to changes in investment opportunities. investment behavior, earnings response coeffi cient, imperfect information, investment sensitivity One of the most important decisions in Corporate Finance is the formulation of optimal investment strategies by firms. The impact of these decisions continues for many years and hence the fi rms have to ensure the optimal allocation of capital to the right investment projects. The fi rms thus allocate limited resources with competing opportunities for achieving their ultimate goal of maximizing shareholder value. Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) establish that outside block holders infl uence fi rms' investment policies and the types of outside block holders determine the diversifi ed abilities and motivations to monitor management and infl uence fi rms' investments. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) show that an increase in the investment/cash fl ow sensitivity is not necessarily an increase in the degree of fi nancial constraints. Cleary (1999) suggest that investments of large fi rms and fi rms with high payout ratios have higher sensitivity to internal funds than small fi rms and fi rms with lower payout ratios.
One of the most important decisions in Corporate
Finance is the formulation of optimal investment strategies by firms. The impact of these decisions continues for many years and hence the fi rms have to ensure the optimal allocation of capital to the right investment projects. The fi rms thus allocate limited resources with competing opportunities for achieving their ultimate goal of maximizing shareholder value. Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) establish that outside block holders infl uence fi rms' investment policies and the types of outside block holders determine the diversifi ed abilities and motivations to monitor management and infl uence fi rms' investments. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) show that an increase in the investment/cash fl ow sensitivity is not necessarily an increase in the degree of fi nancial constraints. Cleary (1999) suggest that investments of large fi rms and fi rms with high payout ratios have higher sensitivity to internal funds than small fi rms and fi rms with lower payout ratios.
The fi nancial theory supports the proposition that the stock price of the fi rm should equal the present discounted value of the fi rm's future cash fl ows. But the investors ideally build their expectations about the future cash fl ows based on the present stream of cash fl ows. Thus the information content in present earnings infl uences the investor's expectation of future earnings. This information can be captured using Earning Response Coeffi cients, which is the coeffi cient that relates the surprise in accounting earnings announcements to abnormal stock returns.
Earnings response coeffi cient looks at the extent of security's abnormal market return with respect to the unexpected aspect of reported earnings. The reasons for diff erences in market response could be many; one case could be variations in beta of companies. The higher the risk associated with the fi rm's expected returns the lower will be the reaction of the investor to a particular amount of unexpected earnings. Also, Capital structure could be a factor where we could expect that ERC for a highly levered fi rm is lower than a fi rm with little or no debt as any good news circulated indicates that the debt holders get this benefi t instead of investors. Sources of increase in current earnings could also aff ect the level of ERC. Earnings expected to persist into the future will result in a higher ERC and if the component in the earnings is non-persistent that will result in a lower ERC.
This stock price sensitivity to earning news further leads us to a question that -Whether a concern about the stock prices by managers lead to investment distortions? Given the importance of current earnings in explaining future earnings the managers would have an incentive to manipulate investor's expectation of future earnings. Hence, the goal to maximize the fi rm's value based on market capitalization is expected to have an eff ect on the investment decisions of the fi rm. Our paper is an attempt to study how fi rms diff er in their investment sensitivity in cases where there share prices are responsive and also in cases where there are unresponsive to earning news. Ball and Brown (1968) were one of the pioneers in documenting the relationship between returns and earnings to assess the usefulness of existing accounting income numbers by examining its information content and timeliness. Beaver (1989) shows that the reported earnings per share in the fi nancial statements are a very important fi gure perceived by the investors. Earning numbers facilitate analysts and investors to forecast future cash fl ows and deal with relative investments risks.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There have been many studies that have tried to document the reasons, situations and benefi ts of the relationship between market returns and earnings. Stein (1989) shows the model of myopic corporate behaviour wherein public fi rm managers in order to avoid negative earning surprises take decisions at the expense of long term benefi ts. Managers try to infl uence investors by reporting higher current cash fl ows, in the hope that investors will increase their expectations of future cash fl ows in response. To boost today's price, the manger under invests, hence creating impression that the fi rm's current and future profi tability is greater than what it really is.
The model of Bebchuk and Stole (1993) works on the eff ects of short run objectives and imperfect information on long run investment decisions. They argue that when the market has incomplete information regarding the return of the investment from long-term projects but can observe investment levels, managers in a desire to impress the stock market may over-invest. Thus, a concern with near-term stock prices or reputation can lead to investment distortions. Graham, Harvey, and Rajagopal (2005) quote that majority of managers would forgo a project with positive net present value (NPV) if the project would cause them to fall short of the current quarter consensus forecast. Bhojraj et al. (2009) worked on fi rms that manage earnings to beat analyst forecasts for a better short-term stock price performance with reductions in discretionary spending and fi rms that increase discretionary expenditures and end up missing analyst forecasts. They document that fi rms that beat forecasts with low quality earnings have a short-run stock price advantage and under perform at a longer horizon relative to the set of fi rms that increased discretionary expenditures and missed forecasts. Gompers (1996) and Baker (2000) study venture capital fi rms for trends in investment distortions. Baker (2000) talks about the career concern approach of managerial behaviour towards investment decisions and argue that if young venture capital fi rms are to attract more capitalare more likely than older venture fi rms to take distortionary actions to enhance their near-term performance. Gompers (1996) documents that there is a tendency of distortionary short-run performance boosting by younger venture fi rms, who in order to enhance their reputation take their start-ups public at an earlier stage of their life-cycle than do older, more established venture fi rms.
Studies related to the information content of accounting earnings has a signifi cant contribution from Easton and Zmijewski (1989) , who study the variation in the stock market response to announcements of accounting earnings for a sample of 216 fi rms using Earnings Response Coeffi cients. They document that there is a positive relation between the ERC and coeffi cient that relate current earnings to future earnings, a positive relation between ERC and fi rm size, but a negative relationship between ERC and systematic risk. Other contributions related to ERC's include work from Colins and Kothari (1989) , who show that stock price change associated with a given unexpected earnings change (the earnings response coeffi cient) exhibits cross-sectional and temporal variation. Chambers et al. (2005) fi nd a robust positive relation between ERCs and total risk that is both economically and statistically signifi cant, and a little empirical support for a negative relation between ERCs and systematic risk. Roger and Robert (1987) fi nd no evidence of the reactions of stock returns to unexpected earnings to be excessively volatile. Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) show that when fi rm reports earnings below the analysts expectations, the response is more negative for fi rms with highert levels of ownership by momentum or agrresive growth investors. Freemen and Senyo (1982) show that marghinal response of stock price to unexpected earnings declines as the absolute magnitude of unexpected earnings increases.
Imhoff and Lobo (1992) fi nd that fi rms with low consensus in the analysts' forecasts of earnings tend to have a low ERC. Teoh and Wong(1993) show that ERC is signifi cant for fi rms with high perception of auditor quality. Ariff and Cheng (2011) show that in case of banking fi rms the information relating to total earnings infl uences share prices signifi cantly with an apparent use of information on disaggregated non-interest fee income to revise share prices signifi cantly. Asker, Mensa and Ljungqvist (2012) by using industry wise Earning Response Coeffi cients analyse the diff erence in investment sensitivities for private and public sector fi rms in the US over the period 2001-2007. They report that for cases where ERC = 0, there is no signifi cant diff erence in investment sensitivities between public and private fi rms but as ERC increases the diff erence in investment sensitivities between these fi rms also increases.
METHODOLOGY
We estimate the ERC of 50 fi rms representing the CNX Ni y Index using the panel data for a sample period of 10 quarters during the period December 2010 to December 2012. We further classify these fi rms into 11 representative industrial sectors and estimate the ERC respectively for these sectors. We use the Prowess database of Indian fi rms with due support from Bloomberg statistics run on E-views 7.0 and present the results.
Theoretical Framework
Garman and Ohlson (1980) and Ohlson (1987a Ohlson ( , b, 1988 ) present theoretical models that show that stock price is a function of all information variables that predict dividends. If the function of time-series processes for the information variables that predict dividends is linear, then price may also be expressed as a linear function of these information variables. According to Easton and Zimvejki this model may be used to derive the ERC for accounting earnings i.e. response coeffi cients for information variables
In the Garman and Ohlson framework, if there are  information variables for fi rm j, at time t, that predict dividends (Z jt ,  = 1, …, ) of which Z 1jt is accounting earnings (A jt ), then, Pjt which is price at time t can be expressed as
In the above equation C js are the response coeffi cients of which C j1 is the ERC. Response coeffi cients can be treated as capitalization factors for the information variables. Following Garman and Ohlson (1980) and Easton and Zmijewski (1989) response coeffi cients are a function of risk and the time-series parameters relating the information variable to future dividends and future information variables. The ERC (C j1 ) here for example is a function of risk and of the time-series parameters relating accounting earnings to future dividends, future accounting earnings, and future nonearnings information variables that predict dividends. Also the abnormal return over a specifi ed period may be written as a linear function of the new information that arrives during that period. The capitalization factors for the information variables are the respective response coeffi cients. Thus as per Easton and Zmijewski (1989) abnormal return (for period t −  through t) which is defi ned as realized return less expected return can be formalized in the following equation
Empirical Model
The empirical distribution of ERCs is estimated using an abnormal returns model. The slope coeffi cient from a regression of abnormal stock returns on unexpected earnings is used to estimate the ERC. The estimation method for ERC conditions unexpected earnings on the market's expectations of earnings immediately before the earnings announcement to abnormal returns immediately around the earnings announcement. Following Easton and Zmijewski (1989) the distribution of ERCs for a sample of fi rms is estimated with an abnormal returns model with a two-day holding period. terms. We fi rst use a generic estimator fi rst to fi nd the coeffi cient of the regressors and then proceed to fi nd the impact of fi xed eff ects (FE) and random eff ects (RE) in the cross sections. We can test whether a fi xed or random eff ects model is appropriate using a Hausman test where and as instruments yields a consistent estimate. is not. We examine how the fi rms diff er in their investment sensitivity in cases where there share prices are responsive and also in cases where there are unresponsive to earning news. We use K-means clustering to make clusters of fi rms with high ERC and fi rms with low ERC and run a regression to check the eff ect of ERC on fi rm's investment sensitivity. The dependent variable for the same is gross investment which is given by annual increase in gross fi xed assets scaled by beginning-of-year total assets and the independent variable is given by sales growth which is a measure of investment opportunity.
CPE(−1, 0)
jt =  j0 +  j1 [H 0 :  i  X it , Z it ; H a :  i  X it ,
RESULTS
We fi rst run a panel regression to estimate the Earning Response Coeffi cients with fi xed eff ects and random eff ects (Tab. II). In order to proceed for selection between the fi xed and random eff ects we use the Hausman (1968) test specifi cations. For the computed Hausman statistic, the p-value for the test is more than 1%, indicating that the fi xed eff ects model is not appropriate and that the random eff ects specifi cation is to be preferred (Tab. I). We therefore use random eff ects model in our analysis.
Earning Response Coeffi cients, as per the random eff ects model shown in Table I indicates that the regression coeffi cients for the entire panel of data comes to −0.177636 and −0.172734 indicating that the surpise in accounting earnings announcements is negatively associated with abnormal stock returns. The fi ndings are not consistent with Easton and Zimvejki who report a positive ERC of 1.649 in their study.
We further run a cross sectional regression to fi nd Industry level ERC (Tab. III) to make clusters of fi rms with high level and low level ERC to further check on the diff erence in their investment sensitivity.
The results as reported in Tab. III show that the ERC's vary cross sectionally. Out of the eleven industries studied, 5 industries show a positive ERC indicating that there is a positive association between unexpected earnings and abnormal stock returns. But 55 % of the fi rms that is fi rms in 6 industries show a negative response of stock prices to accounting earnings announcements. The highest positive value observed for manufacturing sector and equivalent highest negative value for cement. A further exploration shows that management style and constitution is possibly responsible for this behaviour. From the individual ERC's we make two clusters, one that have had a positive response to the earnings announcements and the second that have had a negative response to the earning announcements. On these two clusters we run a regression with the dependent variable as gross investment over lagged assets and the independent variable being investment opportunity defi ned as sales growth (Asker, Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2012) .
Tab. IV indicates the implied investment sensitivities. In positive ERC industries the investment sensitivity is −0.080 and for negative ERC industries the coeffi cient is −0. 
REMARKS
Our paper shows a cross sectional variation in ERC'S i.e. the information content of accounting earnings varies across fi rms. We fi nd that for fi rms for which stock prices are inversely sensitive to earning news are highly negatively responsive to changes in investment opportunities as compared to fi rms that have a positive earning surprise -stock price relationship. The diff erence in the investment sensitivity for the two clusters of fi rms indicates that the sensitivity and responsiveness of share prices to earning news does have an infl uence in shaping the investment decisions of the fi rm. In our study, we use the most recent analyst forecast of earnings as a proxy for the market's expectation of earnings, there could be a measurement error problem in the ERC model as these forecasts may be reported before day -1. As the exact date on which the forecast is made is not reported the measurement error could not be controlled. To conclude, the investment sensitivity varies across Indian fi rms and industries, which may aff ect the corresponding, decision-making behaviours of investors and managers. 
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